Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions by Sumner, James D., Jr.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1958
Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions
James D. Sumner Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
James D. Sumner Jr., Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 Hastings L.J. 128 (1958).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol9/iss2/2
Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions*
By JAMES D. SUMNER, JR.**
Iitroduction
At common law tort actions did not survive.' Thus, upon the death of
either the injured party or the tortfeasor prosecution of a suit for an injury
was barred. This was true regardless of whether death occurred before or
after suit was commenced. The reason generally assigned for the common
law rule was that the cause of action was personal and suit could only be
brought by and against the parties to the alleged wrong.' Such was not true
with respect to contract claims. They were not abated by death at common
law. Likewise today the survivability of contract claims is permitted.4
The common law rule relating to tort claims has been modified by
statute in every jurisdiction in the United States.' There are two types of
relevant statutes: those permitting survival and those allowing revival. A
survival statute changes the common law rule and permits the commence-
ment of an action after death. A revival statute allows the continuation of
pending actions upon death. Such a continuation is usually conditioned on
the survival of the action.
In California the survivability of most tort claims is now permitted, but
not all are included in the statute.'
Within the United States survival has been expanded at different rates
and uniformity of legislation is lacking. Thus, only a few states permit the
survival of actions involving injury to reputation, but most allow survival
of personal injury actions and actions for injury to property.' This lack of
uniformity poses difficult problems in a conflict of laws case when several
states whose survival laws are different are involved in the controversy.
* This article is based upon a study under the auspices of the California Law Revision
Commission. The opinions, conclusions and recommendations, however, are entirely those of
the author, and do not necessarily represent or reflect those of the California Law Revision
Commission, or any of the members thereof.
** Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1941,
Wofford College; LL.B. 1949, University of Virginia; LL.M. 1952, J.S.D. 1955, Yale Univer-
sity. Member of the California and Virginia bars.
1 ATxINSON, WiLLs 683 (2d ed. 1953).
2 See In re Killough's Estate, 143 Misc. 73, 265 N.Y.S. 301, 306 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
3 3 BL. Com.* 302.
4 WLLISTON, CoNTRAcTs, § 1945 (Rev. ed. 1938).
5 For a summary of the legislation see Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Sur-
vival of Tort Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 969
(1930-31).
6 CAL. Civ. CODE § 956 (1949) ; CAL. PROB. CODE § 574 (1953).
7 See note 5, supra. Also see PROSSER, TORTS 953 (1941).
8 Ibid.
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The problem takes on added significance when consideration is given to the
increasing mobility of the American people.
Where there is a difference in the statutes of the states concerned, the
forum must decide whether its own law or the law of another place is to
govern. If the issue is to be decided by the proper state's concepts, which
state is the appropriate one? Even though both the forum and the foreign
state allow survival, these questions might still be crucial because of differ-
ences on matters such as parties, damages, etc." For example, many states
do not limit the damages recoverable in a tort suit containing a survival
element. However, there are limitations under the California statute.10 Sup-
pose, then, that a tort occurs in a state X and one of the parties subse-
quently dies. Further, assume that state X allows survival. Suit is brought
in California. Is the California limitation to be applied?
This general problem was before the Supreme Court of California for
the first time in the relatively recent case of Grant v. McAuliffe." In that
case the plaintiffs were injured in Arizona in an automobile collision with
the defendant's decedent. All parties were residents of California. The de-
fendant's decedent died as a result of the accident prior to the filing of the
suit. The defendant, administrator of the decedent's estate, rejected the
plaintiffs' claims for damages and actions were filed in California against
the estate. Under the law of Arizona actions for personal injuries abate on
the death of the tortfeasor, 2 whereas they survive under the law of Cali-
fornia. The defendant demurred generally and moved to abate the actions
on the ground that the Arizona law was applicable. The trial court granted
defendant's motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The California Supreme
Court reversed the lower court decision holding that the California law
governed. The majority opinion was written by Traynor, J. and concurred
in by Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J. and Carter, J. Justices Schauer, Spence, and
Edmonds dissented. The rationale of the majority opinion is unclear. In
fact, the decision seems to have been based on several theories. The court
first concluded that survival is a matter of procedure and hence governed
by the law of the forum. However, it was intimated that this classification
is to be made only when both parties are residents of California, and that
a different result might be reached when the parties are residents of other
states:
"When, as in the present case, all of the parties were residents of this state
... plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the
laws of this state.". 3
9 See Stoltz v. Burlington Trans. Co., 179 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1949) and La Prelle v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 85 F. Supp. 182 (D. Kans. 1949) (measure of damages); Howard v. Pulver,
329 Mich. 415, 45 N.W.2d 530 (1951) (parties).
10 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 956 (1949).
1141 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
2 McClure v. Johnson, So Ariz. 76, 69 P.2d 573 (1937).
13See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 867, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953).
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In addition it was suggested in the majority opinion that the problem
before the court involved the administration of a decedent's estate, which
is governed by the law of the place of administration, and is not a tort
problem:
"Basically the problem is one of the administration of decedent's estate,
which is a purely local proceeding.
1 4
The Grant case poses several questions that must be considered in order
to determine the soundness of the decision: Are there any controlling pro-
visions of the Constitution? Is survival a procedural or substantive issue?
Assuming it to be a matter of substance, what type of problem is presented
and what choice of law is to be made?
Constitutional Issues
The decision in Grant v. McAuliffe suggests several possible constitu-
tional questions. On the survival issue, as well as in most conflict of laws
problems, there are provisions of our Federal Constitution which may bear
on the manner in which the interstate controversy is to be handled. The
clauses of interest are the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
Due Process Clause
While this provision is a limitation on judicial powers, the state courts
have been permitted almost unfettered freedom in conflict of laws cases.
Accordingly, the state courts have, for the most part, been permitted to
make classifications of laws and legal issues under their own concepts or
under those of a chosen state. Likewise they have been practically free to
apply the law of the place that they determine has legislative competence
respecting a particular transaction.
However, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has
indicated that an outrageous classification by a state court would be a vio-
lation of the Due Process Clause. 5 The California court's decision that
survival is a procedural issue could conceivably be taken by the Supreme
Court to come within this limitation. What of the suggestion in the Grant
case that tort survival poses an administration of estates problem and not
a tort problem? Would this be an outrageous determination? This is not
to say that the classification itself is invalid. However, almost invariably
the classification determines the law to be applied.
14 Id. at 866, 264 P.2d at 949.
15 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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And while the Supreme Court has seldom interfered, it is important to
recognize that the application of the substantive law of a state not having
legislative jurisdiction would be in conflict with the limitations of the Due
Process Clause.1" Thus, as will be mentioned below, it has been suggested
that survival should be decided by the law of the decedent's domicil. Does
this state have interests which are sufficient to warrant overlooking the law
of the place of the wrong?
While the full implications of the Due Process Clause have not been
formulated, they nonetheless should be kept in mind in deciding the sur-
vival of tort claims.
On the basis of the Supreme Court cases one cannot definitely say that
the decision in Grant v. McAuliffe violates the Due Process Clause. How-
ever, the writer is of the opinion that it does and that ultimately we can
expect a ruling by the Supreme Court to this effect. My opinion is based on
the conclusion that the characterization was erroneous or that the choice
of law was improper. The Supreme Court is still taking a cautious approach
to conflicts problems. However, when the need for uniformity of result is
considered, the undesirability of the Grant decision becomes more apparent.
Full Faith and Credit Clause
This clause requires due respect for public acts of sister states and it is
settled that a state statute, among other things, is a public act within the
provision. The relationship between Article IV, Section 1 and the Due
Process Clause is not at all certain. However, it is apparent that the two
are closely related and overlap to some extent. Thus, the application of the
statute of a state not having legislative competence would not only be in
conflict with our concepts of due process but at the same time might result
in the denial of full faith and credit to the statute of a sister state. But
the limitations of the clauses are not entirely mutual. Thus, a refusal to
allow suit on a sister state statute would not be contrary to the Due Process
Clause but would perhaps involve a violation of the comity clause.'
7
It is well settled, however, that full faith and credit need not be given to
procedural statutes of other states. 18 If survival is classified as procedural
and if this determination is not regarded as invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the forum could apply its own survival concepts without in-
fringing on the demands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. However,
IGHartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta Pine Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 193 (1934); Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
17 First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952) ; Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951).
I8 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
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it should be kept in mind that there is apparently a current trend toward
requiring greater full faith and credit for sister state statutes.19
In a subsequent section20 the policies involved in determining whether a
statute is substantive or procedural are indicated. These goals to be sought
in conflict of laws cases cannot be realized under the Grant decision. For
this reason I think the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been violated.
However, I hasten to add that one cannot with certainty say that the Su-
preme Court would have reversed the Grant decision had it been taken to
that tribunal. Here again the reason is the Court's reluctance to make a
full-scale entry into the conflict of laws field.
Privileges and Immunities Clause
The decision in the Grant case presents a possible violation of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause found in Article IV, Section 2 of the Consti-
tution. As previously noted, the California Supreme Court intimated that
its classification of the survival issue as being procedural might be limited
to those instances where all of the parties are residents (domiciliaries) of
California. Thus, the inference is that it might be regarded as substantive
where one of the parties is domiciled in another state. Would this not be
discrimination against non-citizens which is forbidden by the Constitu-
tion?2 It would appear to be.
General Treatment of a Conflict of Laws Case
When confronted with a controversy involving a foreign element there
are several questions, in addition to the constitutional problems, which
must be considered. The first of these is whether there is a local law which
is applicable. This involves the distinction between substantive and reme-
dial laws. Secondly, the court must decide the legal category into which the
facts fit. Thirdly, the choice of law rule to be used must be selected. In
order to understand the ways in which the survival issue has been treated
in the United States, it is necessary to consider each of these processes.
Substance-Procedure
It is settled beyond dispute that the forum applies its own rules of pro-
cedure, or remedy, and the substantive law of the proper place in a conflict
of laws case.22 The principal reason for making this distinction is to avoid
inconveniences and hardships that might be imposed on a court in trying to
19 Note the recent change in the federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948). Also consider
the United Air Lines and Hughes cases cited in note 17 supra.
20 See the section on Substance-Procedure, infra.
21 A similar discrimination is found in the California "borrowing" statute. CAL. CODE Civ.
PGoc. § 361 (1953).
2 2 GooDRIac, CoNtrcT or LAws, § 80 (3d ed. 1949).
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apply all of the law of the proper state. Thus, if courts were required to
apply all of the foreign law, a reorganization of judicial machinery would
often be necessary in conflict of laws cases. Moreover, local concepts of
the administration of justice might be frustrated. At the same time the
courts usually apply the substantive law of the proper state in order to
achieve uniformity of result, a principal policy in the conflict of laws area.
Generally, the classification of the local and the foreign laws is made by
the forum's concepts.' While, as previously suggested, an outrageous deter-
mination might violate the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses,
the state courts have been granted an almost unlimited latitude in this
area. Legislative classification is nonexistent. Therefore the question as to
whether a law is substantive or procedural must be determined by the judi-
ciary. However, a court should be hesitant about classifying its laws as
procedural. A too-liberal application of the forum's laws under the sub-
stantive-procedural distinction would make for great uncertainty of result
and would increase forum shopping. Moreover, in many instances the ex-
pectations of the parties would be frustrated. Unfortunately the courts do
not always consider the above factors in classifyinglaws, nor do they often
consider the purpose for which the classification is being made.24 The dis-
tinctions that are made are usually the results of arbitrary and illogical
determinations and more often than not are based on unsound precedent.
Perhaps the best test that has been suggested for determining whether
a particular matter is one of substance or one of procedure was formulated
by the late Walter Wheeler Cook:
"How far can the court of the forum go in applying the rules taken from
the foreign system without unduly hindering or inconveniencing itself?"25
One would expect more or less uniform treatment of the survival issue
in light of the previous discussion. However, this has not been true. As a
generalization it should be noted at the outset that a preponderance of the
courts regard survival as a matter of substantive law, but the revival issue
is treated with unanimity as being procedural.28 Thus it is generally recog-
nized that survival is governed by the law of the proper state--which in
most instances is taken to be the place of the wrong-but that revival is
controlled by the forum's laws. Moreover, this is the view supported by the
23 Ibid.
24 The writer agrees with Justice Traynor's statement in Grant v. McAuliffe that the char-
acterization of the survival issue is dependent on the purpose for which it is made. The writer
also agrees that the decision in Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal. 2d 437, 224 P.2d 723 (1950) was not
relevant to the issue in the Grant case. In the Steen case survival was classified as substantive
in determining whether the survival statute was to be given retroactive effect.
25 CooK, THE LoGIcAL AxD LEGAL BASEs or T=E Couc.T or LAWS 166 (1949).26 Sftunr, Coimcr or LAWS 189-190 (2d ed. 1951).
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Restatement of Conflict of Laws27 and by the text writers.2 Therefore the
California court's statement that a majority treat survival as a procedural
point is erroneous. Moreover, the cases cited by the court do not sustain
the proposition, as will be noted below. But despite the widespread agree-
ment on the proper rule we find various results being reached in the cases.
In order to understand these divergent results it is better to consider the
different factual situations presented. Throughout the remaining portion
of this paper "X" will be used to refer to the place of the tort and "F" will
be used to designate the forum.
Survival Statute in X But Not in F. Although this was not the factual
pattern of the Grant case, discussion of it is necessary for an understanding
of the survival problem and the Grant decision. In the early cases involv-
ing these facts recovery was generally denied for a variety of reasons. Some
courts stated that a tort survival statute was in derogation of the common
law and thus not enforceable elsewhere.29 They stated that to apply the
foreign statute when no similar one existed in the forum was giving extra-
territorial effect to the laws of X. One of the cases cited by the California
court as holding that survival is procedural involved this principle. 0 While
this reason is seldom given today as a ground for dismissal, others that are
equally absurd are stated. Thus, in the modern cases it is not unusual to
find the courts saying that the enforcement of the X statute would violate
the public policy of the forum." Several of the cases cited in the Grant
case were decided under this principle and did not hold that survival is pro-
cedural.2 Most authorities today conclude that the application of a foreign
survival statute does not violate any fundamental concept of justice exist-
ing in the forum. A broad application of the public policy refusal in such
an instance as this would almost abolish the chance of recovery in a con-
flict of laws case where the X and F laws are different. Moreover, there
appears to be a possible violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause by
such a dismissal in view of two recent cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court.33 Another reason given for denying recovery where X per-
mits survival but the forum does not is that there is a lack of judicial ma-
2 7 
RESTATEM ENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390 (1934).
28 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 294 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 189-
190 (2d ed. 1951); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390.1 (1935).
2 9 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887); O'Reilly v. N.Y. & N.E.
R.R., 16 R.I. 388, 396, 19 Atl. 244 (1889).
3 0 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887).
31 Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940); Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E.
23 (1934); In re Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N.Y.S. 301 (Sur. Ct. 1933) ; Clough v.
Gardiner, III Misc. 244, 182 N.Y.S. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
32 Among them were the New York cases cited in note 31 supra.
33 See note 17 supra.
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chinery available in the forum.34 Thus it is stated that the absence of a
survival statute in F means that the legislature has not invested the courts
with jurisdiction to determine such causes. The New York cases cited in
the Grant case were based on this theory.35 While there is no disagreement
about the power of a legislature to increase or decrease the power or juris-
diction of the courts, it is doubted whether the failure to enact survival
legislation indicates an intention to limit the powers of the courts. The
state courts are given general jurisdiction and this type of suit involves
no unique procedure or remedy.
Lastly, note might be made of an early New York case in which X
allowed survival but the F statute abated a cause of action upon death.
The court denied recovery on the unique ground that the New York stat-
ute was, in effect, a statute of limitations providing that tort actions had
to be brought before death; and since action was not commenced within
that time, it was barred.36 However, this view was not followed in subse-
quent New York cases nor has it been adopted elsewhere.
It should be recognized that while there are many cases denying recov-
ery where F has no survival statute for one or more of the above reasons,
there are numerous cases in which recovery has been allowed. 7 Moreover,
it should be especially noted that in most of the cases in which recovery
was disallowed, the forums did not classify survival as procedural. Denial
of recovery was based on other grounds.
Survival Statute in F But Not in X and Suit Before Death. The facts
assumed here likewise differ from those in Grant v. McAuliffe. In such a
factual situation as this most of the courts have, surprisingly, granted re-
covery though recognizing that survival is substantive. These decisions
have mostly turned on the distinction between survival statutes and revival
statutes. The latter are unanimously considered to be remedial.3 8 The writer
agrees that revival should be classified as procedural. A number of the
34 Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Woollen v. Lorena, 98 F.2d 261 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) ; Muir v. Kessingner, 35 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Wash. 1940) ; Doughterty v. Gutenstein,
10 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) ; Herzog v. Stem, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934) ; Demuth
v. Griffin, 253 App. Div. 399, 2 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1938); Taynton v. Vollmer, 242 App. Div. 854,
275 N.Y.S. 284 (1934); Silverman v. Rappaport, 165 Misc. 543, 300 N.Y.S. 76 (1937); In re
Villas, 166 Ore. 115, 110 P.2d 940 (1941).
35 These cases are cited in note 34 supra.
36Matter of Killough's Estate, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N.Y.S. 301 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
37 Vallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949); McIntoch v. General Chemical De-
fense Corp., 67 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. W.Va. 1948) ; Keston v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W.
329 (1932); Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931); Burg. v. Knox,
334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W.2d 96 (1933); Domres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630, 260 N.Y. Supp. 335
(1932) overruled by Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934) ; Parsons v. American
Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1934).
3 8 
STUMaBRG, Con-ucr or LAws 190 n-30 (2d ed. 1951) ; also see Orr. v. Ahern, 107 Conn.
174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928).
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cases cited by the California Supreme Court in Grant v. McAuliffe involved
revival. The substitution of a party and continuation of a suit after death
under a revival statute is usually conditioned on the survival of the cause
of action. 9 Most of the courts have determined the answer to the condition
by looking to the law of the forum.40 Therefore, since we are assuming that
survival is allowed at the forum, recovery is granted even though the action
abates under the law of X, the place of the wrong.
In another group of cases recovery has been permitted where the forum
has survival and revival statutes although the action is abated under the
foreign law. However, the recovery in these cases has been placed on a
basis different from that described in the preceding paragraph. The theory
upon which recovery has been granted is that once suit is brought the cause
of action becomes a local one and the law of the other state cannot deprive
the forum of its jurisdiction.4
Survival Statute in F But Not in X and Suit After Death. Grant v.
McAuliffe is apparently the only case in which recovery has been allowed
where the action was commenced after death and where survival was not
permitted at the place of the wrong. In fact there are many cases involving
this situation in which recovery has been disallowed.4 The decision in the
California case was based on survival being classified as a matter of proce-
dure-which is definitely against the overwhelming weight of authority in
the United States.
3 9 Note that such a condition appears in the California revival statute, CAL. CODE Civ.
PRoc. § 385 (1953).
40 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226 (1899); Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
151 U.S. 673 (1894); Luster v. Martin, 58 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 637
(1932) ; Page v. United Fruit Co., 3 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, Northern
R.R. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65 (1927); Martin v. Wabash R.R., 142 Fed. 650 (7th Cir. 1905);
Winslow v. Domestic Engineering Co., 20 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Gaskins v. Bonfils,
4 F. Supp. 547 (D. Colo. 1933), affd, 79 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1935); Portland Gold Mining
Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 196 Fed. 714 (D. Colo. 1912) ; Ekstrom v. U.S., 21 F. Supp.
338 (Ct. C1. 1937); Gordon v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 154 Iowa 449, 134 N.W. 1057
(1912); Austin's Adm'r v. Pittsburg, C.C. & St.L. R.R., 122 Ky. 304, 91 S.W. 742 (1906).
Contra: Allen v. Whitehall Pharmacal Co., 115 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Rathgeber v.
Sommerhalder, 112 N.J.L. 546, 171 At. 835 (1934).
41 See Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928).
42 E.g., Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933); Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Dines,
126 Fed. 968 (C.C.D. Colo. 1904), aff'd on other grounds, 135 Fed. 449 (8th Cir. 1905);
Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 At. 691 (1928) ; Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry., 61 Iowa
441, 16 N.W. 351 (1883); Dalton v. McLean, 137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940) ; Trudel v. Gagne,
328 Mass. 464, 104 N.E.2d 489 (1952); Yount v. National Bank, 327 Mich. 342, 42 N.W.2d 110
(1950) ; Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 166 Ati. 119 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933) ; Sumner
v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 167 Ati. 315 (1933) ; O'Reilly v. New York & N.E. R.R., 16 R.I. 388,
17 At. 171 (1889); Mexican Central Ry. v. Goodman, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 48 S.W. 778
(1898); Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38 Vt. 294 (1865); accord, Allen v. Whitehall Phar-
macal Co., 115 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, 112 N.J.L. 546, 171
At. 835 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
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It is difficult to reconcile the decision with previous rulings by the Cali-
fornia court. In past cases the prevailing classifications have been followed
in California." Therefore, the only conclusion to be reached respecting the
Grant case is that an erroneous determination was made or that the court
was greatly influenced by the "sympathy" factors in the case. Moreover,
as has been demonstrated, the decision in Grant v. McAuliffe was the result
of the court's failure to analyze properly the cases upon which it relied.
Classification of Survival and Revival Statutes. One of the principal
goals in setting up conflict of laws rules is to provide for uniformity and
certainty of result. In order to achieve this purpose the role of the forum
should be minimized as much as possible. Hence, absent other factors, the
mere fact that suit is brought in a state should not warrant an overzealous
application of the forum's laws. Otherwise forum shopping is encouraged
and the result in a given case becomes dependent on the place where suit is
brought. However, because of the possible inconveniences, it is established
that the forum utilizes its own rules of remedy. But as noted above the dis-
tinction between substantive and remedial laws should be determined by
the factor of inconvenience. No more hardship is placed on a court by re-
quiring it to apply the survival rule of another state than is encountered
with the application of any other foreign law. Moreover, survival is in effect
an incident of the cause of action. Since it is established that the existence
of a cause of action is determined by the law of the proper state, that law
should likewise govern survival. Therefore survival should be treated as
substantive. This suggestion is strengthened by the realization that it is so
classified in all other states. Moreover, by giving a procedural classification
to survival, forum shopping is encouraged. No doubt this argument is
weakened to some extent by the limitation on the powers of foreign admin-
istrators to sue and be sued outside the state of appointment.44 However,
this obstacle has been eliminated by statutes in some states and can fre-
quently be overcome in the others by the appointment of an ancillary
administrator or by a showing of unusual circumstances.45 It is true that
there are many cases in which the forum has applied its own survival con-
4 3 Eg., Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941) (statute of limitations
is procedural) ; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 241 Pac. 861 (1925) (California type of stat-
ute of frauds held procedural) ; Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932) (standard
of care is substantive); Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365,
159 P.2d 1 (1945) (whether contributory negligence precludes recovery is a substantive issue) ;
Spreckels v. Hawaiian. Com. & Sugar Co., 117 Cal. 377, 49 Pac. 353 (1897) (damages treated
as substantive).
44 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1913 (1953).
45 In exceptional cases the California Supreme Court has departed from the usual rule.
See In re Estate of Rawitzer, 175 Cal. 585, 166 Pac. 581 (1917) and Fox v. Tay, 89 Cal. 339,
26 Pac. 897 (1891).
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cepts. But as discussed above these cases involved the application of out-
dated or illogical concepts. The decisions in those cases were not based on
survival being classified as procedural.
On the other hand, revival involves only a substitution of parties. In
view of the fact that the question of proper parties has always been deter-
mined by the law of the forum there is no sound reason to change this rule.
However, revival should not be permitted, even though provided for at the
forum, unless the cause of action survives by the law of the proper state.
Characterization of the Probler
If survival of a tort action is to be treated as procedural, the forum
applies its own rules and that concludes the matter. However, if it is re-
garded as substantive, further issues must be resolved. Assuming it to be
substantive, the next step is to determine the type of problem presented by
the facts-commonly described as characterization of the facts. This is a
determination that is made by the forum under its own concepts. No doubt
the Due Process Clause limits a court's power in making the classification,
but as a practical matter the courts have had almost unlimited discretion."
Ordinarily no particular difficulty is encountered because agreement on the
type of problem would be reached by all courts. However, a set of facts
often presents a choice. Such a choice is presented where tort survival is
involved. For example, suppose that A of State F is injured by B of State F
in State X and B dies before suit is brought. Further assume that there is
survival in F but not in X. If suit is brought in F by A against B's personal
representative, the forum could characterize this as a tort problem or as a
problem involving the administration of a decedent's estate. Facts such as
these have been characterized by most of the courts in the United States
as giving rise to a tort question. Supporting this solution is the idea that in
a suit for personal injuries there is a tort claim rather than a problem of
administering a decedent's estate. Moreover, it should be noted that if
there were no death, the law of State X would be used. Why should a sub-
sequent event, death in this instance, change the nature of the issue? The
characterization of the problem is determinative of the choice of law that
is made. Under the general practice the above example would be classified
as a tort problem and it is axiomatic that the law of the place of the wrong
governs. Thus probably all courts would look to the place of the tort and
thereby uniformity of result would be assured.
It is arguable, however, that the tort survival issue should be viewed as
presenting the problem of administering a decedent's estate. Most suits
dealing with survival are brought at the place of administration, irrespec-
46 See note 15 supra.
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five of whether the decedent was the injured party or wrongdoer. This is
necessary because of the difficulties of obtaining jurisdiction and because
of procedural bars to a suit by a foreign personal representative4 More-
over, in a survival suit there is an issue of whether a claim may be made by
or against a decedent's estate. Therefore, survival cannot be completely
divorced from the administration of the decedent's estate. Such a character-
ization was deemed relevant by the California Supreme Court in Grant v.
McAuliffe. Justice Traynor stated in the majority opinion:
"Basically the problem is one of the administration of decedents' estates."
48
However, there is but slight authority to support this conclusion.49
Moreover, the cases cited by the California Court do not support the prop-
osition. It is inescapable that the basic problem is one of tort recovery. The
court is not asked to distribute a decedent's estate nor is the issue one in-
volving administration. Had death not occurred, the law of the place of the
tort would have been used. Had wrongful death recovery been sought, the
law of the place of the wrong would have been applied. Why should death
affect this usual approach? In addition, it should be noted that uniformity
will not be achieved under this alternative. If it is classified as an adminis-
tration problem, the law of the place of administration will be used. It
would be impossible to achieve uniformity of result under this approach.
The result to be reached would vary from forum to forum, depending on
where administration is had.
Choice of Law
After having characterized the problem in a conflict of laws case, the
court must next select a choice of law rule. This rule points to the state
whose substantive laws will be applied. The rule to be used is principally
governed by the characterization of the facts. The selection is made by the
forum and the states have had almost complete freedom in this area. How-
ever, the attempted use of a rule involving the application of the law of a
state not having a substantial connection with a transaction would no doubt
be in violation of the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, or both.
47 See note 44 supra.
48 41 Cal. 2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953).
49See Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896), aff'd, 86 Fed. 405 (2d Cir.
1898) ; Doughterty v. Gutenstein, 10 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) ; Herzog v. Stem, 264 N.Y.
379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597 (1934); Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73,
265 N.Y.S. 301 (Sur. Ct. 1933); ef. Dombrowski v. Dunn, 69 F. Supp. 42 (D. Vt. 1946). For
cases rejecting this novel argument see Yount v. National Bank, 327 Mich. 342, 42 N.W.2d 110
(1950); Needham v. Grand Trunk R.R., 38 Vt. 294 (1865). A criticism of this suggestion is
also found in Htacocx, TORTS nl T CoNislcrm Or LAWS § 53 (1942).
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If survival is deemed to present an administration problem, the local
law will be used because the local law of the place of administration deter-
mines the assets of a decedent's estate as well as the claims that can be
charged against it. Such a choice of law is uniformly made where it is
decided that tort survival presents an administration type of problem.50
However, it should be noted that such matters as damages, defenses, etc.,
are generally regarded as substantive and therefore governed by the law of
the place of the wrong. Hence, if we treat survival as an administration
problem, the question of whether the action abated would be controlled
by the place of administration, the existence of a cause of action, damages,
defenses, etc., would be determined by the place of the wrong, and matters
of remedy would be controlled by the law of the forum. What particular
purpose is served by the almost endless confusion resulting from this appli-
cation of different state laws under different concepts?
On the other hand, if the survival issue is classified as a tort problem
there are several choice of law rules that might be used. One of these is
that survival should be governed by the law of the decedent's domicil.
While there is some authority to support this possibility,5 it is open to
numerous criticisms. The most obvious one is that through its use liability
would be dependent on one state's laws and survival on another. Morever,
the domicil suggestion would lead to difficult questions as to where the
decedent was domiciled and what the result would be if both parties die
having different domiciles.
The rule having the strongest support is the one that makes survival
dependent on the law of the place of the tort. Had there been no death this
law would have been used. Why should death diminish the importance of
the place of the wrong? Moreover, under all existing theories liability is
determined by, or modeled after, the law of the place of injury. Should not
the effect of death on liability be determined by this law as are damages,
etc.? If this law is used, the same result can be expected irrespective of
where suit is brought or where the parties happened to be fortuitously
domiciled. Further support for the use of this choice of law rule is to be
found in the fact that this is the law applied by most of the states. 52 More-
over, it has the recommendation of many of our current writers.5 3 Thus,
the current authority favors the use of the law of the place of the tort. If
uniformity is to be achieved, California should follow the generally ac-
50 E.g., Whitten v. Bennett, 77 Fed. 271 (C.C.D. Conn. 1896), aff'd, 86 Fed. 405 (2d Cir.
1898) ; Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. 73, 265 N.Y.S. 301 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
51 See Whitten v. Bennett, note 50 supra; HANcocK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53
(1942).
52 See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 189 (2d ed. 1951); GooDicm, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 294
(3d ed. 1949).
53 Ibid.; RESTATEmENT, CoxlicT OF LAWS § 390 (1934).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
LAW GOVERNING SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
cepted rule. Its application has too much support to expect a reversal in
another direction within the near future.
Conclusions
It was previously stated that the tort survival issue should be deemed
a substantive issue. Moreover, it was suggested that a case involving this
question be classified as a tort problem to be answered by the law of the
place of the wrong. And lastly, it was mentioned that revival be treated as
a procedural matter to be governed by the law of the forum. However,
revival should not be allowed unless the cause of action survives by the law
of the proper state. Obviously some of these conclusions are opposed to the
decision in Grant v. McAuliffe. This raises the question of whether that rul-
ing should be changed by statute. While one's initial reaction favors such
action, further reflection suggests caution. The survival problem is only
one of many issues encountered in a conflict of laws case. The instances in
which the substance or procedure question arises are numerous. It is per-
tinent respecting parties, damages, the statute of limitations, admissibility
of evidence, presumptions, etc. Might not legislation on survival be cause
for subsequent legislation on all these matters in the event of subsequent
California cases? Thus the question is whether legislation should be en-
acted which might lead to codification of many, if not all, of the conflict
of laws principles to be used in California.
Moreover, conflicts cases involve very flexible facts. Alternative courses
are presented in every step. It is for this reason that there is almost a dearth
of legislation in the field.5" If legislation were enacted providing that the
survival of a tort action is to be controlled by the place of the wrong, this
would still leave considerable discretion in the court. Where is the place
of the wrong? If A is negligent in State X and this negligence leads to
injury in State Y might not State X or State Y be chosen? Further assume
that the parties were residents of the same state, as was true in Grant v.
McAuliffe. Could not the state of residence be reasonably considered the
state with the primary interests and hence the place of the wrong?55 There
is yet another situation in which this discretion would be present. Suppose
that the wrongdoer is a railroad company on which the injured party, now
deceased, was a passenger. Instead of characterizing the problem as one of
torts invoking a possible statute, it could be classified as a contract prob-
lem which would call for different principles. 5
5 4 There are only a few statutes in California that deal with conflicts cases: e.g., CAL. Civ.
CODE § 3451 (1949) (foreign assignment for creditors); CAL. Civ. CODE § 1646 (1949) and
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1857 (1953) (law governing interpretation of contracts); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 63 (1949) (foreign marriages); CAL. Civ. CODE § 946 (1949) (law governing personal
property); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 361 (1953) (borrowing statute).
5 5 See CooK, TtE LoGICAL AND LEGAL BAs s or Tim CoNrn.CT or LAWS 311 (1949).
56 See Dyke v. Erie R.R., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
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In addition the writer does not think that the decision in Grant v. Mc-
Auliffe, which is generally believed to be unsound, is a sufficient basis for
legislative reform. It should be especially noted that all of the parties in
Grant v. McAuliffe were California residents. Moreover, Arizona's survival
law is outdated and not in accord with California's, nor those found in
most of the other states. Because of these special facts Grant v. McAuliffe
might not be followed in a case presenting other facts. And lastly, as pre-
viously noted, the rationale of the Grant decision is not clear. For these
reasons legislation on survival might be premature. While it is certainly
proper for the Legislature to modify judicial rules of great import, it is
doubtful whether the Grant case is an instance which would warrant a
statute specifically directed to it.
These objections to survival legislation cannot be avoided. However, a
statute would no doubt cure some of the existing injustices. Moreover, the
existence of survival legislation would at least indicate a legislative policy
to guide the courts in subsequent cases. While the writer does not recom-
mend its adoption, the following type of proposed statute could be consid-
ered to modify the Grant decision:
Survivorship of a tort action shall be determined by the law of the place
of the wrong, but revival shall be governed by local law. However, revival
shall not be permitted unless the cause of action survives at the place of the
wrong.
It was mentioned above that the enactment of a survival statute might
lead to, or suggest, similar legislation covering parties, damages, presump-
tions, etc. Since all of these involve the same basic distinction-substance
or procedure--the advisability of a statute prescribing a standard to be
used in making the distinction in all cases is raised. Would not such a stat-
ute be more desirable than one dealing with only the survival point? This
question quite obviously calls for an affirmative answer. However, the
writer finds it impossible to draft such a statute that would be meaningful.
The basic test suggested by Cook57 is undoubtedly the soundest and most
easily applied formula that can be reasonably used. But just how would
you draft a statute containing his suggestion that would be meaningful?
It will be recalled that the inconvenience placed on a court by the applica-
tion of a foreign rather than a local law should govern the distinction be-
tween matters of substance and those of remedy. Thus under his test no
particular hardship would be imposed on a court by applying the survival
law of the place of the wrong. However, a judge who was inclined to apply
local law, as no doubt most are, could well conclude that the application
of any foreign law would result in inconvenience. Aside from this inclina-
57 Op. cit. supra note 55, at 166.
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tion how would questions of proper parties, right to jury trial, forum of
action, etc., be classified under Cook's test? Surely there would be agree-
ment that these matters should be treated as procedural. However, they
could well be classified as substantive under Cook's test. And yet this has
never been suggested or contemplated. The reason is that Cook's formula
is generally brought up in a broad treatment of the conflict of laws rules.
Thus, the test derives its meaning from the context in which it is used.
However, a statute does not, and should not, take the form of an exposition
on the topic it covers. The statute should be self-explanatory and should
cover most of the possibilities that will arise on the subject. The writer
does not feel that a worthwhile statute covering the distinction between
substantive and remedial laws can be written.
There is yet another type of general statute that should be considered.
In view of the disadvantages of a general statute defining substance and
procedure, perhaps a statute setting forth those matters which are to be
treated as substantive and those to be regarded as remedial should be
deliberated. A statute worded as follows is suggested for consideration:
In conflict of laws cases the following matters shall be treated as remedial:
pleadings, right to jury trial, parties, whether equitable relief is available,
joinder of causes of action, counterclaim and setoff, burden of proof, pre-
sumptions, statute of limitations, admissibility of evidence, revival (if the
action survives by the law of the proper state), and competency of wit-
nesses. However the following shall be deemed substantive: existence of a
cause of action, defenses to a cause of action, damages, survival (contract
survival by the place of execution and tort survival by the place of the tort),
and the effect of contributory negligence.
The writer has not attempted to exhaust the possibilities presenting the
substance or procedure issue in the above suggested statute. However, the
most commonly encountered matters are enumerated. Moreover, with the
classification above a court would no doubt treat other analogous issues
accordingly. Therefore a statute classifying the various issues would not
be subject to the criticisms of a general statute which defines substance and
procedure. By suggesting these classifications the writer does not intend to
convey the idea that there is unanimity of opinion among the courts on
these issues. However, the classifications mentioned are given by a prepon-
derance of the courts. Hence further uniformity of result can be expected
if California follows these prevailing rules. In addition, most of the matters
mentioned in the proposed statute have already been dealt with in Cali-
fornia. The suggested and prevailing classifications are in accord with the
California decisions,5 except as to survival.
In summary, the writer does not recommend a specific statute directed
5 See note 43 sapra.
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at the decision in Grant v. McAuliffe. However, he does recommend that
a general statute be adopted, changing the rule of the Grant case and clas-
sifying other matters which present the substance-procedure issue. The
adoption of these classifications would make for certainty of result in Cali-
fornia and would be an advance toward the accomplishment of uniformity
of result-a principal goal in conflict of laws cases. Moreover, the sug-
gested classifications would serve as a useful guide when similar questions
that are too numerous to detail are presented.
Recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission
After the submission of the writer's study the California Law Revision
Commission determined that it should not recommend the enactment of a
statute specifying what law should govern survival of actions arising else-
where when suit is brought in California.59 This decision was based on the
following considerations:6 (1) The survival issue is but a part of the larger
problem of differentiating between matters of substance and matters of
procedure. Any legislation in this area should embrace the entire problem
and not merely one facet of it. (2) The application of the California statute
in the Grant case was not unjustified. All of the parties were residents of
California and application of the archaic Arizona law of nonsurvivability
was avoided. (3) The Grant decision does not clearly indicate that the Cali-
fornia courts should, or would, apply the California law of survival in all
cases.
5 9 
See CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMmiSsIoN, RECOMMENDATIOg AND STUDY RELATII
TO CHOICE Or LAW GovER-NING SuRvivAL OF AcnoNs, p. 6 (Feb. 1, 1957).
6 0 Id. at 5-6.
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